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 Status of This Memo
 
    This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
    Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
    improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
    Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
    and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
 
 Copyright Notice
 
    Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
 
 Abstract
 
    This document specifies how to establish secure connection-oriented
    media transport sessions over the Transport Layer Security (TLS)
    protocol using the Session Description Protocol (SDP).  It defines a
    new SDP protocol identifier, ’TCP/TLS’.  It also defines the syntax
    and semantics for an SDP ’fingerprint’ attribute that identifies the
    certificate that will be presented for the TLS session.  This
    mechanism allows media transport over TLS connections to be
    established securely, so long as the integrity of session
    descriptions is assured.
 
    This document extends and updates RFC 4145.
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 1.  Introduction
 
    The Session Description Protocol (SDP) [1] provides a general-purpose
    format for describing multimedia sessions in announcements or
    invitations.  For many applications, it is desirable to establish, as
    part of a multimedia session, a media stream that uses a connection-
    oriented transport.  RFC 4145, Connection-Oriented Media Transport in
    the Session Description Protocol (SDP) [2], specifies a general
    mechanism for describing and establishing such connection-oriented
    streams; however, the only transport protocol it directly supports is
    TCP.  In many cases, session participants wish to provide
    confidentiality, data integrity, and authentication for their media
    sessions.  This document therefore extends the Connection-Oriented
    Media specification to allow session descriptions to describe media
    sessions that use the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol [3].
 
    The TLS protocol allows applications to communicate over a channel
    that provides confidentiality and data integrity.  The TLS
    specification, however, does not specify how specific protocols
    establish and use this secure channel; particularly, TLS leaves the
    question of how to interpret and validate authentication certificates
    as an issue for the protocols that run over TLS.  This document
    specifies such usage for the case of connection-oriented media
    transport.
 
    Complicating this issue, endpoints exchanging media will often be
    unable to obtain authentication certificates signed by a well-known
    root certification authority (CA).  Most certificate authorities
    charge for signed certificates, particularly host-based certificates;
    additionally, there is a substantial administrative overhead to
    obtaining signed certificates, as certification authorities must be
    able to confirm that they are issuing the signed certificates to the
    correct party.  Furthermore, in many cases endpoints’ IP addresses
    and host names are dynamic: they may be obtained from DHCP, for
    example.  It is impractical to obtain a CA-signed certificate valid
    for the duration of a DHCP lease.  For such hosts, self-signed
    certificates are usually the only option.  This specification defines
    a mechanism that allows self-signed certificates can be used
    securely, provided that the integrity of the SDP description is
    assured.  It provides for endpoints to include a secure hash of their
    certificate, known as the "certificate fingerprint", within the
    session description.  Provided that the fingerprint of the offered
    certificate matches the one in the session description, end hosts can
    trust even self-signed certificates.
 
    The rest of this document is laid out as follows.  An overview of the
    problem and threat model is given in Section 3.  Section 4 gives the
    basic mechanism for establishing TLS-based connected-oriented media
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    in SDP.  Section 5 describes the SDP fingerprint attribute, which,
    assuming that the integrity of SDP content is assured, allows the
    secure use of self-signed certificates.  Section 6 describes which
    X.509 certificates are presented, and how they are used in TLS.
    Section 7 discusses additional security considerations.
 
 2.  Terminology
 
    In this document, the key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED",
    "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY",
    and "OPTIONAL" are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [4] and
    indicate requirement levels for compliant implementations.
 
 3.  Overview
 
    This section discusses the threat model that motivates TLS transport
    for connection-oriented media streams.  It also discusses in more
    detail the need for end systems to use self-signed certificates.
 
 3.1.  SDP Operational Modes
 
    There are two principal operational modes for multimedia sessions:
    advertised and offer-answer.  Advertised sessions are the simpler
    mode.  In this mode, a server publishes, in some manner, an SDP
    session description of a multimedia session it is making available.
    The classic example of this mode of operation is the Session
    Announcement Protocol (SAP) [15], in which SDP session descriptions
    are periodically transmitted to a well-known multicast group.
    Traditionally, these descriptions involve multicast conferences, but
    unicast sessions are also possible.  (Connection-oriented media,
    obviously, cannot use multicast.)  Recipients of a session
    description connect to the addresses published in the session
    description.  These recipients may not previously have been known to
    the advertiser of the session description.
 
    Alternatively, SDP conferences can operate in offer-answer mode [5].
    This mode allows two participants in a multimedia session to
    negotiate the multimedia session between them.  In this model, one
    participant offers the other a description of the desired session
    from its perspective, and the other participant answers with the
    desired session from its own perspective.  In this mode, each of the
    participants in the session has knowledge of the other one.  This is
    the mode of operation used by the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
    [16].
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 3.2.  Threat Model
 
    Participants in multimedia conferences often wish to guarantee
    confidentiality, data integrity, and authentication for their media
    sessions.  This section describes various types of attackers and the
    ways they attempt to violate these guarantees.  It then describes how
    the TLS protocol can be used to thwart the attackers.
 
    The simplest type of attacker is one who listens passively to the
    traffic associated with a multimedia session.  This attacker might,
    for example, be on the same local-area or wireless network as one of
    the participants in a conference.  This sort of attacker does not
    threaten a connection’s data integrity or authentication, and almost
    any operational mode of TLS can provide media stream confidentiality.
 
    More sophisticated is an attacker who can send his own data traffic
    over the network, but who cannot modify or redirect valid traffic.
    In SDP’s ’advertised’ operational mode, this can barely be considered
    an attack; media sessions are expected to be initiated from anywhere
    on the network.  In SDP’s offer-answer mode, however, this type of
    attack is more serious.  An attacker could initiate a connection to
    one or both of the endpoints of a session, thus impersonating an
    endpoint, or acting as a man in the middle to listen in on their
    communications.  To thwart these attacks, TLS uses endpoint
    certificates.  So long as the certificates’ private keys have not
    been compromised, the endpoints have an external trusted mechanism
    (most commonly, a mutually-trusted certification authority) to
    validate certificates, and the endpoints know what certificate
    identity to expect, endpoints can be certain that such an attack has
    not taken place.
 
    Finally, the most serious type of attacker is one who can modify or
    redirect session descriptions: for example, a compromised or
    malicious SIP proxy server.  Neither TLS itself nor any mechanisms
    that use it can protect an SDP session against such an attacker.
    Instead, the SDP description itself must be secured through some
    mechanism; SIP, for example, defines how S/MIME [17] can be used to
    secure session descriptions.
 
 3.3.  The Need for Self-Signed Certificates
 
    SDP session descriptions are created by any endpoint that needs to
    participate in a multimedia session.  In many cases, such as SIP
    phones, such endpoints have dynamically-configured IP addresses and
    host names and must be deployed with nearly zero configuration.  For
    such an endpoint, it is for practical purposes impossible to obtain a
    certificate signed by a well-known certification authority.
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    If two endpoints have no prior relationship, self-signed certificates
    cannot generally be trusted, as there is no guarantee that an
    attacker is not launching a man-in-the-middle attack.  Fortunately,
    however, if the integrity of SDP session descriptions can be assured,
    it is possible to consider those SDP descriptions themselves as a
    prior relationship: certificates can be securely described in the
    session description itself.  This is done by providing a secure hash
    of a certificate, or "certificate fingerprint", as an SDP attribute;
    this mechanism is described in Section 5.
 
 3.4.  Example SDP Description for TLS Connection
 
    Figure 1 illustrates an SDP offer that signals the availability of a
    T.38 fax session over TLS.  For the purpose of brevity, the main
    portion of the session description is omitted in the example, showing
    only the ’m’ line and its attributes.  (This example is the same as
    the first one in RFC 4145 [2], except for the proto parameter and the
    fingerprint attribute.)  See the subsequent sections for explanations
    of the example’s TLS-specific attributes.
 
    (Note: due to RFC formatting conventions, this document splits SDP
    across lines whose content would exceed 72 characters.  A backslash
    character marks where this line folding has taken place.  This
    backslash and its trailing CRLF and whitespace would not appear in
    actual SDP content.)
 
    m=image 54111 TCP/TLS t38
    c=IN IP4 192.0.2.2
    a=setup:passive
    a=connection:new
    a=fingerprint:SHA-1 \
           4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB
 
        Figure 1: Example SDP Description Offering a TLS Media Stream
 
 4.  Protocol Identifiers
 
    The ’m’ line in SDP specifies, among other items, the transport
    protocol to be used for the media in the session.  See the "Media
    Descriptions" section of SDP [1] for a discussion on transport
    protocol identifiers.
 
    This specification defines a new protocol identifier, ’TCP/TLS’,
    which indicates that the media described will use the Transport Layer
    Security protocol [3] over TCP.  (Using TLS over other transport
    protocols is not discussed in this document.)  The ’TCP/TLS’ protocol
    identifier describes only the transport protocol, not the upper-layer
    protocol.  An ’m’ line that specifies ’TCP/TLS’ MUST further qualify
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    the protocol using a fmt identifier to indicate the application being
    run over TLS.
 
    Media sessions described with this identifier follow the procedures
    defined in RFC 4145 [2].  They also use the SDP attributes defined in
    that specification, ’setup’ and ’connection’.
 
 5.  Fingerprint Attribute
 
    Parties to a TLS session indicate their identities by presenting
    authentication certificates as part of the TLS handshake procedure.
    Authentication certificates are X.509 [6] certificates, as profiled
    by RFC 3279 [7], RFC 3280 [8], and RFC 4055 [9].
 
    In order to associate media streams with connections and to prevent
    unauthorized barge-in attacks on the media streams, endpoints MUST
    provide a certificate fingerprint.  If the X.509 certificate
    presented for the TLS connection matches the fingerprint presented in
    the SDP, the endpoint can be confident that the author of the SDP is
    indeed the initiator of the connection.
 
    A certificate fingerprint is a secure one-way hash of the DER
    (distinguished encoding rules) form of the certificate.  (Certificate
    fingerprints are widely supported by tools that manipulate X.509
    certificates; for instance, the command "openssl x509 -fingerprint"
    causes the command-line tool of the openssl package to print a
    certificate fingerprint, and the certificate managers for Mozilla and
    Internet Explorer display them when viewing the details of a
    certificate.)
 
    A fingerprint is represented in SDP as an attribute (an ’a’ line).
    It consists of the name of the hash function used, followed by the
    hash value itself.  The hash value is represented as a sequence of
    uppercase hexadecimal bytes, separated by colons.  The number of
    bytes is defined by the hash function.  (This is the syntax used by
    openssl and by the browsers’ certificate managers.  It is different
    from the syntax used to represent hash values in, e.g., HTTP digest
    authentication [18], which uses unseparated lowercase hexadecimal
    bytes.  It was felt that consistency with other applications of
    fingerprints was more important.)
 
    The formal syntax of the fingerprint attribute is given in Augmented
    Backus-Naur Form [10] in Figure 2.  This syntax extends the BNF
    syntax of SDP [1].
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    attribute              =/ fingerprint-attribute
 
    fingerprint-attribute  =  "fingerprint" ":" hash-func SP fingerprint
 
    hash-func              =  "sha-1" / "sha-224" / "sha-256" /
                              "sha-384" / "sha-512" /
                              "md5" / "md2" / token
                              ; Additional hash functions can only come
                              ; from updates to RFC 3279
 
    fingerprint            =  2UHEX *(":" 2UHEX)
                              ; Each byte in upper-case hex, separated
                              ; by colons.
 
    UHEX                   =  DIGIT / %x41-46 ; A-F uppercase
 
    Figure 2: Augmented Backus-Naur Syntax for the Fingerprint Attribute
 
    A certificate fingerprint MUST be computed using the same one-way
    hash function as is used in the certificate’s signature algorithm.
    (This ensures that the security properties required for the
    certificate also apply for the fingerprint.  It also guarantees that
    the fingerprint will be usable by the other endpoint, so long as the
    certificate itself is.)  Following RFC 3279 [7] as updated by RFC
    4055 [9], therefore, the defined hash functions are ’SHA-1’ [11]
    [19], ’SHA-224’ [11], ’SHA-256’ [11], ’SHA-384’ [11], ’SHA-512’ [11],
    ’MD5’ [12], and ’MD2’ [13], with ’SHA-1’ preferred.  A new IANA
    registry of Hash Function Textual Names, specified in Section 8,
    allows for addition of future tokens, but they may only be added if
    they are included in RFCs that update or obsolete RFC 3279 [7].
    Self-signed certificates (for which legacy certificates are not a
    consideration) MUST use one of the FIPS 180 algorithms (SHA-1,
    SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, or SHA-512) as their signature algorithm,
    and thus also MUST use it to calculate certificate fingerprints.
 
    The fingerprint attribute may be either a session-level or a media-
    level SDP attribute.  If it is a session-level attribute, it applies
    to all TLS sessions for which no media-level fingerprint attribute is
    defined.
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 6.  Endpoint Identification
 
 6.1.  Certificate Choice
 
    An X.509 certificate binds an identity and a public key.  If SDP
    describing a TLS session is transmitted over a mechanism that
    provides integrity protection, a certificate asserting any
    syntactically valid identity MAY be used.  For example, an SDP
    description sent over HTTP/TLS [20] or secured by S/MIME [17] MAY
    assert any identity in the certificate securing the media connection.
 
    Security protocols that provide only hop-by-hop integrity protection
    (e.g., the sips protocol [16], SIP over TLS) are considered
    sufficiently secure to allow the mode in which any valid identity is
    accepted.  However, see Section 7 for a discussion of some security
    implications of this fact.
 
    In situations where the SDP is not integrity-protected, however, the
    certificate provided for a TLS connection MUST certify an appropriate
    identity for the connection.  In these scenarios, the certificate
    presented by an endpoint MUST certify either the SDP connection
    address, or the identity of the creator of the SDP message, as
    follows:
 
    o  If the connection address for the media description is specified
       as an IP address, the endpoint MAY use a certificate with an
       iPAddress subjectAltName that exactly matches the IP in the
       connection-address in the session description’s ’c’ line.
       Similarly, if the connection address for the media description is
       specified as a fully-qualified domain name, the endpoint MAY use a
       certificate with a dNSName subjectAltName matching the specified
       ’c’ line connection-address exactly.  (Wildcard patterns MUST NOT
       be used.)
 
    o  Alternately, if the SDP session description of the session was
       transmitted over a protocol (such as SIP [16]) for which the
       identities of session participants are defined by uniform resource
       identifiers (URIs), the endpoint MAY use a certificate with a
       uniformResourceIdentifier subjectAltName corresponding to the
       identity of the endpoint that generated the SDP.  The details of
       what URIs are valid are dependent on the transmitting protocol.
       (For more details on the validity of URIs, see Section 7.)
 
    Identity matching is performed using the matching rules specified by
    RFC 3280 [8].  If more than one identity of a given type is present
    in the certificate (e.g., more than one dNSName name), a match in any
    one of the set is considered acceptable.  To support the use of
    certificate caches, as described in Section 7, endpoints SHOULD
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    consistently provide the same certificate for each identity they
    support.
 
 6.2.  Certificate Presentation
 
    In all cases, an endpoint acting as the TLS server (i.e., one taking
    the ’setup:passive’ role, in the terminology of connection-oriented
    media) MUST present a certificate during TLS initiation, following
    the rules presented in Section 6.1.  If the certificate does not
    match the original fingerprint, the client endpoint MUST terminate
    the media connection with a bad_certificate error.
 
    If the SDP offer/answer model [5] is being used, the client (the
    endpoint with the ’setup:active’ role) MUST also present a
    certificate following the rules of Section 6.1.  The server MUST
    request a certificate, and if the client does not provide one, or if
    the certificate does not match the provided fingerprint, the server
    endpoint MUST terminate the media connection with a bad_certificate
    error.
 
    Note that when the offer/answer model is being used, it is possible
    for a media connection to outrace the answer back to the offerer.
    Thus, if the offerer has offered a ’setup:passive’ or ’setup:actpass’
    role, it MUST (as specified in RFC 4145 [2]) begin listening for an
    incoming connection as soon as it sends its offer.  However, it MUST
    NOT assume that the data transmitted over the TLS connection is valid
    until it has received a matching fingerprint in an SDP answer.  If
    the fingerprint, once it arrives, does not match the client’s
    certificate, the server endpoint MUST terminate the media connection
    with a bad_certificate error, as stated in the previous paragraph.
 
    If offer/answer is not being used (e.g., if the SDP was sent over the
    Session Announcement Protocol [15]), there is no secure channel
    available for clients to communicate certificate fingerprints to
    servers.  In this case, servers MAY request client certificates,
    which SHOULD be signed by a well-known certification authority, or
    MAY allow clients to connect without a certificate.
 
 7.  Security Considerations
 
    This entire document concerns itself with security.  The problem to
    be solved is addressed in Section 1, and a high-level overview is
    presented in Section 3.  See the SDP specification [1] for security
    considerations applicable to SDP in general.
 
    Offering a TCP/TLS connection in SDP (or agreeing to one in SDP
    offer/answer mode) does not create an obligation for an endpoint to
    accept any TLS connection with the given fingerprint.  Instead, the
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    endpoint must engage in the standard TLS negotiation procedure to
    ensure that the TLS stream cipher and MAC algorithm chosen meet the
    security needs of the higher-level application.  (For example, an
    offered stream cipher of TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL SHOULD be rejected
    in almost every application scenario.)
 
    Like all SDP messages, SDP messages describing TLS streams are
    conveyed in an encapsulating application protocol (e.g., SIP, Media
    Gateway Control Protocol (MGCP), etc.).  It is the responsibility of
    the encapsulating protocol to ensure the integrity of the SDP
    security descriptions.  Therefore, the application protocol SHOULD
    either invoke its own security mechanisms (e.g., secure multiparts)
    or, alternatively, utilize a lower-layer security service (e.g., TLS
    or IPsec).  This security service SHOULD provide strong message
    authentication as well as effective replay protection.
 
    However, such integrity protection is not always possible.  For these
    cases, end systems SHOULD maintain a cache of certificates that other
    parties have previously presented using this mechanism.  If possible,
    users SHOULD be notified when an unsecured certificate associated
    with a previously unknown end system is presented and SHOULD be
    strongly warned if a different unsecured certificate is presented by
    a party with which they have communicated in the past.  In this way,
    even in the absence of integrity protection for SDP, the security of
    this document’s mechanism is equivalent to that of the Secure Shell
    (ssh) protocol [21], which is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks
    when two parties first communicate, but can detect ones that occur
    subsequently.  (Note that a precise definition of the "other party"
    depends on the application protocol carrying the SDP message.)  Users
    SHOULD NOT, however, in any circumstances be notified about
    certificates described in SDP descriptions sent over an integrity-
    protected channel.
 
    To aid interoperability and deployment, security protocols that
    provide only hop-by-hop integrity protection (e.g., the sips protocol
    [16], SIP over TLS) are considered sufficiently secure to allow the
    mode in which any syntactically valid identity is accepted in a
    certificate.  This decision was made because sips is currently the
    integrity mechanism most likely to be used in deployed networks in
    the short to medium term.  However, in this mode, SDP integrity is
    vulnerable to attacks by compromised or malicious middleboxes, e.g.,
    SIP proxy servers.  End systems MAY warn users about SDP sessions
    that are secured in only a hop-by-hop manner, and definitions of
    media formats running over TCP/TLS MAY specify that only end-to-end
    integrity mechanisms be used.
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    Depending on how SDP messages are transmitted, it is not always
    possible to determine whether or not a subjectAltName presented in a
    remote certificate is expected for the remote party.  In particular,
    given call forwarding, third-party call control, or session
    descriptions generated by endpoints controlled by the Gateway Control
    Protocol [22], it is not always possible in SIP to determine what
    entity ought to have generated a remote SDP response.  In general,
    when not using authenticity and integrity protection of SDP
    descriptions, a certificate transmitted over SIP SHOULD assert the
    endpoint’s SIP Address of Record as a uniformResourceIndicator
    subjectAltName.  When an endpoint receives a certificate over SIP
    asserting an identity (including an iPAddress or dNSName identity)
    other than the one to which it placed or received the call, it SHOULD
    alert the user and ask for confirmation.  This applies whether
    certificates are self-signed, or signed by certification authorities;
    a certificate for sip:bob@example.com may be legitimately signed by a
    certification authority, but may still not be acceptable for a call
    to sip:alice@example.com.  (This issue is not one specific to this
    specification; the same consideration applies for S/MIME-signed SDP
    carried over SIP.)
 
    This document does not define any mechanism for securely transporting
    RTP and RTP Control Protocol (RTCP) packets over a
    connection-oriented channel.  There was no consensus in the working
    group as to whether it would be better to send Secure RTP packets
    [23] over a connection-oriented transport [24], or whether it would
    be better to send standard unsecured RTP packets over TLS using the
    mechanisms described in this document.  The group consensus was to
    wait until a use-case requiring secure connection-oriented RTP was
    presented.
 
    TLS is not always the most appropriate choice for secure connection-
    oriented media; in some cases, a higher- or lower-level security
    protocol may be appropriate.
 
 8.  IANA Considerations
 
    This document defines an SDP proto value: ’TCP/TLS’.  Its format is
    defined in Section 4.  This proto value has been registered by IANA
    under "Session Description Protocol (SDP) Parameters" under "proto".
 
    This document defines an SDP session and media-level attribute:
    ’fingerprint’.  Its format is defined in Section 5.  This attribute
    has been registered by IANA under "Session Description Protocol (SDP)
    Parameters" under "att-field (both session and media level)".
 
    The SDP specification [1] states that specifications defining new
    proto values, like the ’TCP/TLS’ proto value defined in this one,
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    must define the rules by which their media format (fmt) namespace is
    managed.  For the TCP/TLS protocol, new formats SHOULD have an
    associated MIME registration.  Use of an existing MIME subtype for
    the format is encouraged.  If no MIME subtype exists, it is
    RECOMMENDED that a suitable one be registered through the IETF
    process [14] by production of, or reference to, a standards-track RFC
    that defines the transport protocol for the format.
 
    This specification creates a new IANA registry named "Hash Function
    Textual Names".  It will not be part of the SDP Parameters.
 
    The names of hash functions used for certificate fingerprints are
    registered by the IANA.  Hash functions MUST be defined by standards-
    track RFCs that update or obsolete RFC 3279 [7].
 
    When registering a new hash function textual name, the following
    information MUST be provided:
 
    o  The textual name of the hash function.
 
    o  The Object Identifier (OID) of the hash function as used in X.509
       certificates.
 
    o  A reference to the standards-track RFC, updating or obsoleting RFC
       3279 [7], defining the use of the hash function in X.509
       certificates.
 
    Figure 3 contains the initial values of this registry.
 
    Hash Function Name     OID                         Reference
    ------------------     ---                         ---------
    "md2"                  1.2.840.113549.2.2          RFC 3279
    "md5"                  1.2.840.113549.2.5          RFC 3279
    "sha-1"                1.3.14.3.2.26               RFC 3279
    "sha-224"              2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.4      RFC 4055
    "sha-256"              2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1      RFC 4055
    "sha-384"              2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.2      RFC 4055
    "sha-512"              2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.3      RFC 4055
 
             Figure 3: IANA Hash Function Textual Name Registry
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